

10-7968

16 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : General Breitweiser's Briefing to the President's Board

1. I think you will be interested in the briefing which General Breitweiser gave to the President's Board on October 3, and which he sent to me for our information. It does not contain anything startling but it does reflect trends which will have an increasing impact on Agency relations with the military in the field of foreign intelligence. Some of these I mentioned in my memorandum to you on the effects of the Department of Defense's reorganization last April.

2. General Breitweiser summarizes the more important of his trends in subparagraphs a to f on pages 4 and 5, and in his discussion of the relationships with the Service intelligence organizations on page 6. With regard to the latter note particularly his "majority of one" remark in the third paragraph of page 6. He seems to view the future of J-2 relationship as somewhat comparable to your DCI function with regard to the NIEs. This rather underscores the increasing impact of J-2 over the JIC responsibility which has existed heretofore, but it can hardly help but increase the stature of J-2 with respect to the departmental intelligence chiefs which has existed heretofore.

3. Note also the comments relative to the relations with the new J-3 (Operational Directorate) and to the support for the White House Situation Room.

4. With regard to the overseas commands he is not yet very clear but it seems obvious that the trend will certainly be for the J-2 channels to assert more and more authority in the intelligence field. This may be helpful in the long run but I would not look for any immediate effects in these commands. For example, General Picher remarked to me last week that he rather expected that it would take about two years to complete the reorganization and attain its full impact.

5. General Breitweiser does not mention Agency relationship to the JCS in the event of a major emergency. This strikes me as being the cloudiest area that faces the community.

JCS review(s) completed.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.

General, USA (Ret.)

Deputy Director (Coordination)

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE DOC)



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 October 1958

Dear General Truscott,

I thought you would be interested in seeing the attached script of a briefing I recently gave the Hull Board at their request. We consider it as unclassified, but are handling it as official use only material.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert A. Breitweiser", is positioned above the typed name.

ROBERT A. BREITWEISER  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff

General L. K. Truscott, USA  
Deputy Director for Coordination  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

Briefing by Director for Intelligence,  
The Joint Staff

to

Hull Board  
(President's Board of Consultants on  
Foreign Intelligence Activities)

on

3 October 1958

I know it's bad form for a briefer to profess any indecisiveness regarding his topic. But I must emphasize that many parts of our discussion will necessarily be tentative and even speculative.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the new charter of the Joint Staff related thereto, and the attendant revisions of the Department of Defense Directives on functions and relations are necessarily very broad and very generalized. The specific implementation of these directives as they affect relationships of J-2 with the Service intelligence agencies and with the unified and specified commands is still in the formative stages. Many or even most of the ideas I will present have yet to meet the test of time. They will be validated or invalidated only by trial-and-error experimentation. In a sense, I'll be giving you an estimate of future intelligence relationships, with the same connotations of probabilities rather than certainties with which we are all familiar in intelligence estimates.

But I don't want to give you the impression that the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff is fumbling around with conceptual problems while the other functional elements of the Joint Staff have arrived at crystal-clear and precisely delineated guidance for their inter-Service, and unified command relationships. It's fair to say that all of the Joint Staff is right now in the formative stages of trying to define just what these relationships should be. And it's fair, too, to say that no element of the staff believes that all of the tentative methods set up initially will necessarily prove themselves sound over the longer term.

With this prelude, let's briefly examine, on a before-and-after basis, the functions of the Joint Staff in general and of the J-2 in particular.

The primary change flowing from the new law is elimination of the "Executive Agency" function exercised by the military departments. All of the really major alterations in the role

of the Joint Staff are reflections of the impact of this change on the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And, as I will develop later, the J-2 functional changes are, in turn, largely manifestations of the normal staff role we must play as the working partner of Operations and Plans--J-3 and J-5.

The increase in direct burden on the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body is fundamentally in the functions of command and operational direction. Formerly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, were directed

Chart No. 1  
(Attached)

"To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including guidance for the operational control of forces and for the conduct of combat operations." Note the phrases "strategic direction" and "guidance for." (We've supplied the underlining.) The intent of these words--and their manner of implementation--clearly was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff not involve themselves in day-to-day command and operational dealings with the unified commanders. This is borne out by the charge levied on the Executive Agency

Chart No. 1  
(Attached)

to "receive and transmit orders . . . for strategic direction and for conduct of combat operations in emergency and wartime situations."

With Executive Agencies out of this operational line, the Joint Chiefs will retain their former planning and strategic guidance responsibilities and assume the directive and command responsibilities not hitherto exercised corporately by them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the additional function be spelled out thus,

Overlay to Chart No. 1  
(Attached)

"To direct operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands, and to discharge any other necessary function of command for commands established by the Secretary of Defense."

The new Department of Defense Directive accomplishing this has not yet been published.

The acquisition of this job by the Joint Chiefs of Staff required the establishment of an Operations Directorate--J-3--within the Joint Staff.

Chart No. 2  
(Attached)

It is our J-2 relations with this new J-3 staff agency which will, in my opinion, stimulate the majority of the changes in our work.

A word on manning of the Joint Staff. The increase in strength is going to be very modest. The new law authorized the Joint Staff a maximum of 400 officers as compared to the former 210 ceiling. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to exercise their full option: The new manning documents provide for 356 officers. This increase of roughly 150 officers includes the needs of the new J-3--62 officers; the new J-1--16 officers; and the new Programs Office--14 officers, all of which take up nearly 2/3's of the increase. So the augmentation that could be provided to existing staff sections was quite small. J-2 officer strength was increased by 18, to a total of 68 from its former authorization of 50.

The new J-2 functional charter, just as with its new manning tables, is only modestly changed from its predecessor. It is a simplified and combined version of two earlier charters, one for the former Joint Intelligence Committee and one for the former Joint Intelligence Group.

This chart

Chart No. 3  
(Attached)

highlights the alterations. All of the previous functions were retained; so, for streamlining, I've not shown those except where significant changes in wording were made. (These are underlined.)

Some changes in wording have been made to render a function more explicit, such as the addition of the words, "and counter-intelligence" under number 3. The military definition for some years has defined counterintelligence as a phase of intelligence.

In other cases, as in numbers 3 and 7, addition of wording, ("procedures"), points up the greater attention to detail in coordination envisioned by the change in organizational concept.

The only new "duty" found in this listing is number 10, "provide for the participation in authorized relationships with counterpart organizations of foreign governments." This was inserted to recognize a function performed over the years by the Joint Intelligence Committee in dealing with such matters as the Standing Group Intelligence Estimate for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization. It is new only in the sense that it was not expressly covered in the charter before, although it was being done.

So only in the general preamble of the charter do we find any really new points: The first is an explicit recognition that J-2, in common with other organizations in the intelligence community, has certain responsibilities and relationships under NSCID's; this recognition is coupled with a statement that nothing within the J-2 charter is intended to conflict with the provisions of NSCID's. As an intelligence specialist, I found these inclusions very satisfying; not that they will change anything in J-2's operation, but their very presence seems to demonstrate a growing policy level awareness of the close inter-relationship and inter-dependence of the elements of the intelligence community.

The other new point in the preamble is a statement that "The Intelligence Directorate will provide intelligence support to the Operations Directorate in its operation of a Joint War Room."

This is one facet of our coming work with the new J-3, which I mentioned earlier. The rest of our support to J-3 will be encompassed by our broad responsibility of "providing that intelligence which is required by the Joint Staff." So let me turn to a more specific discussion of the sorts of thing we're likely to be doing over and above our former work. Here is an organizational chart which may help make my remarks easier to follow.

#### (J-2 Organization Chart)

Here, in the Current Intelligence Division, will come the greatest change. This change must involve both an increase in our speed of reaction to "hot" intelligence information and an increase in our capability to give a meaningful though short-term estimate of the significance and portent of the information. I expect this Division to perform a number of J-2 innovations. For example:

a. They'll provide the 24-hour intelligence support for the Joint War Room. This will be a two-way street--the knowledge we acquire from the Joint War Room about operational actions and plans will sharpen our focus in screening and analyzing the take.

b. They'll provide 24-hour Joint Staff intelligence liaison with nonmilitary government agencies. I'm specifically charged with providing such liaison on behalf of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. I consider this liaison to include providing information on short-term military plans or operations that will aid agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and State to interpret the "take," and National Security Agency to review its collection emphasis. Much of the time such info will already be available to those agencies; but we can be useful as a sort of guarantor and backstop.

c. They will provide the direct current intelligence support required on a crash basis by the Director of the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs. I'm referring here to the ad hoc needs for current information, displays, briefings, or interpretations on any given matter which may arise during a meeting of the Chiefs. We do some of this now, but it's unpredictable whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff will call on us or on one of the Services. I expect they'll turn to us automatically, once all the unified commands are operating directly with the Chiefs.

d. By the same token, I believe the unified commanders will demand that J-2 evaluations be provided them on various intelligence reports. I'll expect the Current Intelligence Division to handle this also. I feel sure that CINCEUR, for example, will want to know what evaluations are being given the Joint Chiefs on a matter pertaining to his area--if for no other reason than to be able to furnish the Chiefs his view if he disagrees!

e. They provide J-2 representation on the Watch Committee of U.S.I.B. I believe the vigor and degree of contribution by J-2 to this very important committee must and will increase markedly. With first-hand and across-the-board knowledge of current J.C.S. operational as well as intelligence interests, we should be of considerable assistance in suggesting points for Watch Committee consideration and in doing our part in the group's analytical effort.

f. They discharge for the J.C.S. the obligation of supporting the White House Situation Room. This involves regular liaison to insure currency of order of battle and will involve provision of briefing support at times of crisis or emergency relocation. I feel sure that this workload will increase as the Joint Staff operational function reaches full force.

In the other phases of our work I foresee less change. With respect to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we will continue to provide substantive intelligence support as at present. Joint Staff military advice on intelligence matters not requiring J.C.S. consideration will continue to be supplied by us to O.S.D. through and at the request of General Erskine.

Our effort will be to sharpen our perception of the specific interests and needs of our customers in the Office of the Secretary and to tailor our products accordingly.

Our relationships with the three Service intelligence organizations will be marked by even greater dependence on their support than heretofore. Obviously the minor personnel increase in J-2 will barely support our manpower requirements to be continuously aware of the needs of the J.C.S., J-3 and unified commanders; to meet those needs quickly and soundly we must look to the Services to carry much of the workload by giving us prompt, thorough analytical advice and support in their areas of primary interest. The Lebanon and Taiwan affairs have already given us all a feel for the problems involved. The dispatch and cooperation with which those special needs are being met make me confident that long-term solutions will be easy.

The requirement for Service contributions to joint intelligence estimates needed by the planners in J-5 and by the unified commands will continue as before. So will the practice of our action officer working with Service action officers in drafting such estimates, as well as the submission of the final draft to the Service intelligence chiefs for their concurrence or comment.

The J-2 charter refers to a number of functional duties by the phrase, "formulate and coordinate plans and policies" for so-and-so. These are not new in and of themselves. They were duties formerly allocated to the Joint Intelligence Committee. Although that committee no longer exists, and although these tasks are now charged to J-2, the manner of discharging them will be practically unchanged. There will be the same degree of participation by the Services and the same review process afforded the Service intelligence chiefs. It is, however, theoretically possible for an intelligence policy proposal to reach the Director of the Joint Staff or the Joint Chiefs with my view represented as a majority of one, and the three Services all dissenting. Thus, the reorganization concept provides, for J-2 in common with the other Directorates of the Joint Staff, greater recognition of the validity of a Joint Staff view in its own right; rather than solely as a blend of three Service views.

Our intent in this area is not to change procedures but rather to bring about a more active sort of J-2 stimulus to cooperative review of some policy and procedural problems. I believe, for instance, that the events of this summer have provided test tube examples of some field reporting and intermediate analysis which are duplicative and which overburden the communicators needlessly. This is the sort of thing we plan to work with the Services on--but it will be a revival of an old function, not inauguration of a new one.



As to our J-2 relationships with the unified commands: This is where the crystal ball becomes cloudiest. I have an idea that much of the final answer here will be determined by the attitudes and desires of the field commanders themselves. Since these attitudes will vary, it's likely that we'll end up with a specially tailored modus operandi for each separate command.

In general, though--aside from our coming on stream along with the operational channel as already discussed--I expect that we'll assume a role as a sort of "trouble shooter" for the unified commands. The many, many intelligence support jobs now provided them by the Military Services will continue as before--such things as producing and disseminating various publications; processing of sensitive clearances; procurement and supply of intelligence materials like maps, escape and evasion equipment, or recognition charts; furnishing of investigative or counter-intelligence services, and so on.

But, as I see it, we'll be the office that receives the complaints or gripes if anything goes wrong or if the command feels short-changed. I think the field commands will expect us to be their agent in fixing things they're unhappy about; but they know, just as we do, that we can't and shouldn't take on the job of intermediary in the thousand and one daily tasks now being performed for them by the military departments.

We'll have to prepare for this role by being more aware of the various actions being taken by the Army, Navy, and Air Force on behalf of the unified commanders. This can be easily done by improving our liaison with the Services and by arranging to get information copies of pertinent communications between the field commands and the Pentagon.

To sum up: We foresee no really monumental changes in Joint Staff intelligence relationships. We do anticipate a number of readjustments in our manner and type of work, principally stemming from the new operational function of the Joint Staff. We hope to revive some dormant functions, and perhaps to discard some functions no longer useful; but these will be in the nature of improving our own internal efficiency and not related to the reorganization per se.

We do believe that the stature of the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate will tend to rise--always provided we don't undercut the trend by actions which would make us appear unworthy of increased stature! This trend seems to us to flow almost automatically from such things as the seating of J-2 on the new U. S. Intelligence Board; from the reflected glow of the new operational responsibilities of the Joint Staff; and, indeed, as a dividend from the increasing prestige which I believe the entire intelligence community is acquiring as time goes by.


## GENERAL:

- ① RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS UNDER NSCID'S ARE RECOGNIZED.
- ② SUPPORT OPERATION OF THE JOINT WAR ROOM.

## FUNCTIONS:

- ③ FORMULATE & COORDINATE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PLANS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE JCS.
7. FORMULATE & COORDINATE PLANS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
10. PROVIDE FOR THE PARTICIPATION IN AUTHORIZED RELATIONSHIPS WITH COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

# *Organization of the Joint Staff*



\* AUTH OFFICER STRENGTH

CHART NO 2

JCS

"TO PREPARE STRATEGIC PLANS, TO PROVIDE FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FORCES AND FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS, TO DIRECT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, AND TO DISCHARGE ANY OTHER NECESSARY FUNCTION OF COMMAND FOR COMMANDS ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE."

*OVERLAY TO CHART No 1*


JCS

"TO PREPARE STRATEGIC PLANS AND  
TO PROVIDE FOR THE STRATEGIC  
DIRECTION OF THE ARMED FORCES,  
INCLUDING GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATIONAL  
CONTROL OF FORCES AND FOR THE  
CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS."

EXECUTIVE AGENCY

"RECEIVE AND TRANSMIT ORDERS.....  
FOR STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND FOR  
CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN  
EMERGENCY AND WARTIME SITUATIONS."

# *J-2 Intelligence Directorate*



~~ROCK~~ WAT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**

12

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	OO/I	nah	5 NOV 1958
2	AO/NE <i>cu</i>	SK	6 Nov
3	A/PO/CI <i>lgm</i>	1 Nov	
4	A/DD/I	Sh	13 Nov
5	(?)	AKK	
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	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
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Remarks:

A real fifth wheel - too small to make a worthwhile substantive contribution and big enough to be an awful nuisance.  
Esp. to its military colleagues.

3-4. You will want to read this.

Ky

**FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER**

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
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